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ii

REPLY TO THE CITY'S STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The order of the trial court consists of a declaration of statutory construction.
The court's written order states that "there is no material difference on the
dispositive point of law between the two versions of the statute at issue. Under
either the 2001 or 2003 versions of the disconnection statute, if a disconnection
would result in an unincorporated island, the disconnection should be disallowed."
See Order dated June 3, 2008. R. at 1111. Both parties and the trial court agree
that allowing a disconnection in this case would result, at least theoretically, in an
island of unincorporated territory bordered on two sides by Cedar Hills and on two
sides by Pleasant Grove. R. at 1112. See the map of the Harvey property that is
the subject of this disconnection, attached as Tab 6 in the Addendum to the city's
brief. The trial court's ruling does not consider any facts other than the location of
the property and the fact that an unincorporated island would result if
disconnection were allowed.
The city has included numerous factual assertions in their brief. These facts
and many of their arguments are an attempt to persuade the court that
disconnection is not viable or in the interests of justice. The facts presented by the
city are an inaccurate and incomplete representation of the complex factual history
surrounding this disconnection matter. Several of the facts cited in the city's brief
1

are disputed and the inclusion of these statements on appeal is both disingenuous
and irrelevant to the present issue on appeal. The Harveys have resisted the
temptation to present their own laundry list of facts that indicate the city's
culpability in this matter.
In ruling that both the 2001 and 2003 versions of the disconnection statute
completely bar unincorporated islands of any kind, the trial court denied the parties
the opportunity to present the factual evidence as to the appropriateness of the
disconnection. Indeed, the Harvey's primaiy objective in raising this appeal is to
be allowed to present evidence of the viability of the disconnection as well as the
factual situation which prompted their petition for disconnection. The Harveys are
confident that, given this opportunity, the court will recognize that granting
disconnection is clearly in the interests of justice and equity.
Due to the complexity of this eight-year-old case, there is a mountain of
evidence on both sides which would be persuasive in determining the
appropriateness of the disconnection in terms of viability and justice. However,
this court is not charged with making that determination on appeal. The
presentation of this evidence is properly reserved for the trial court on remand after
this court rules that the plain language of the 2001 disconnection statute does not
constitute an automatic bar of all unincorporated islands.
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The issue on appeal is simple. If there is any conceivable factual scenario in
which an unincorporated island would be allowed under the 2001 statue, then the
case should be remanded to the trial court where the parties can present the factual
evidence for the judge's consideration.

REPLY TO THE CITY'S ARGUMENT
I. THE PROPOSED DISCONNECTION DOES NOT CREATE AN
UNINCORPORATED ISLAND RESULTING WITHIN OR
PROJECTING INTO THE BOUNDARIES OF CEDAR HILLS
As stated in the Harveys' principle brief, the 2001 statute does not even
contain the term "island of unincorporated territory." The islands referred to in the
2001 statute are islands which "result within or project into the boundaries of the
municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§

10-2-503(2)(i) (2001). Brief of the Harveys at 10-13.
The city admits that while the 2003 statute clarified that unincorporated
islands of any kind are absolutely prohibited, that prior versions of the statute dealt
only with islands wholly within a single city. Brief of the city at 17. The city
indicates that Utah courts have always first determined whether or not an island
was created prior to making a determination with respect to disconnection. Id. at
21. However, the cases cited by the city in support of this argument all indicate
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that the courts considered only unincorporated islands wholly within the city
boundaries. In Re Disconnection of Certain Territory from Highland, 668 P.2d
544, 546 (Utah 1983) ("disconnection would create no islands or peninsulas
within the city's boundaries...."); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Farmington
City, 599 P.2d 1242, 1247 (Utah 1979) ("avoid the creation of an unincorporated
island in the midst of the city...."). Emphasis added.
The property at issue in this case would not create an island of
unincorporated territory either wholly within or projecting into Cedar Hills. See
the map of the Harvey property that is the subject of this disconnection, attached as
Tab 6 in the Addendum to the city's brief. The subject property is bordered on two
sides by Cedar Hills and on two sides by Pleasant Grove. The facts are clear. The
Harvey disconnection would not result in the type of unincorporated island
prohibited by the 2001 statue.

H. UNDER THE 2001 DISCONNECTION STATUTE, THE CREATION
OF UNINCORPORATED ISLANDS AND/OR PENINSULAS IS ONE
OF SEVERAL FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE
DETERMINATION OF VIABILITY AND JUSTICE

Under the 2001 version of the disconnection statute, the discussion of islands
and peninsulas is part of a lengthy list of factors to be considered in determining

4

whether the disconnection will materially increase the cost and burden of providing
services to other areas within the city.
10-2-503 Criteria for disconnection.
(1) The commissioners shall determine whether or not disconnection
will leave the municipality with a residual area within its boundaries for
which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of municipal services would
materially increase over previous years or for which it would become
economically or practically unreasonable to administer as a municipality.
(2) in making that determination, the commissioners shall consider
all relevant factors including the effect of the disconnection on:
(a) the city or community as a whole;
(b) adjoining property owners;
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways;
(d) water mains and water services;
(e) sewer mains and sewer services;
(f) law enforcement;
(g) zoning;
(h) other municipal services; and
(i) whether or not islands or unreasonably large and varied-shaped
peninsular land masses result within or project into the boundaries of
the municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-503 (2001). Emphasis added

While the city employs some creative arguments indicating that factor (i) on
this long list of relevant factors is a determinative factor, the plain language of the
statute simply does not support this argument. The city insists that the creation of
an island or peninsula will always materially increase the cost of providing
municipal services. See brief of the city at 16. There is nothing in the text of the
statute that indicates that the legislators intended this to be a "super factor" holding
5

more weight than any other factor on this list. The city's argument is based almost
entirely on arguments gleaned from dicta in the Blujfdale case which discusses the
2003 statute, which clearly disallows unincorporated islands of any kind, rather
than the 2001 statute at issue in this appeal. Blujfdale Mountain Homes, L.C., v.
Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, 167 P.3d 1016.
The city reasons that each individual factor listed in the statute must "carry a
meaning and value separate from the balance of the statute." Brief of the city at 15.
The city then makes the bold assumption that the ONLY possible reason for
evaluating whether islands and offending peninsulas result from the petition to
disconnect is because they inherently disrupt, impair or inhibit services. Id.
Because the impact of the disconnection on various municipal services are listed as
separate factors, the city argues that unless the creation of islands and offending
peninsulas are out-rightly prohibited, that the inclusion of the island/peninsula
factor would be superfluous. Id.
This argument is unpersuasive for a couple of different reasons. First, the
first factor to be considered is the effect of the disconnection on 'the city or
community as a whole." This broadly construed factor would clearly encompass
all of the other factors. Under the city's reasoning, all subsequent factors would be
superfluous. Secondly, there are other reasons why a court might wish to consider
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the creation of an island or peninsula other than the impact on municipal services.
Indeed, there is nothing in the plain language of the statute to indicate that any of
the factors are dispositive.
The city further argues that the intent of the 2001 statute is made clear by the
2003 statute. In support of this argument, the city cites the oral testimony of
legislators introducing the 2003 bill. However, this testimony does not speak to
the legislators' intent when drafting the 2001 version. In fact, there is no need for
the court to look to oral legislative testimony or other documents at all because the
plain language of the statute is not ambiguous. Statutory construction begins and,
if possible, ends with the statute's plain language. State v. Burns, 4 P.3d 795 (Utah
2002); State v. Redd, 992 P.2d 986, 990 (Utah 1999).
The 2001 disconnection statute requires the consideration of various factors
in determining the viability and equity of allowing the disconnection. None of
these factors are outcome determinative. The plain language of the statute merely
requires the fact finder to consider all of the factors in weighing the
appropriateness of the disconnection. These factors must be considered and
findings of fact regarding these factors are required. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-505
(5) (2001). This statutory construction is consistent with other provisions within
the Utah Code that use the identical language "shall consider all relevant factors."
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IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AMOUNT TO A
FACTUAL INQUIRY AND SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY A
TRIER OF FACT
The public policy considerations against creation of islands listed by the city
include: symmetrical municipal boundaries, the ability of the county to provide
services to the island, and the ability of the city to provide services within the city.
Brief of the city at 23. As stated previously, these considerations are taken from
the Bluffdale case, which is based on the 2003 statute. Bluffdale, 2007 UT 57.
Each of these considerations are entirely fact specific. In order to determine
the appropriate outcome based on these factors, the parties should be given the
opportunity to present evidence with respect to the boundaries and the ability of
the various local governments to provide needed services. Despite the city's
efforts to interject unsubstantiated facts and arguments based on services and park
land in the city, it would not be appropriate for the court to make a determination
since no evidence was heard in the trial court below.

CONCLUSION
The issue before the court is simple. Does the 2001 disconnection statute
allow for the creation of an unincorporated island of any kind? Clearly the answer
to this question is yes. The creation of unincorporated islands is one factor to be

10

considered under this statute as a part of the total analysis of the viability and
justice of approving disconnection. Further, the 2001 statute does not even
require the fact finder to consider islands that are not wholly within the city or
protruding into the city. In this case, the Harvey property does not constitute an
island wholly within or protruding into the city. The Harveys have been denied
the opportunity to present their case for disconnection as a result of the inaccurate
interpretation of the statute.
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the decision of the district
court granting summary judgment to the City of Cedar Hills. The matter should
be remanded to the district court with instructions to hear evidence and make a
final determination based upon the substantive criteria outlined in the 2001
disconnection statute.
DATED this

h day of March 2009.
DUVAL HAWS & MOODY, P.C.

Gordon Duval
Attorney for Appellants
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